We examine individual harvesters' preferences for government enforcement of a quota imposed on the exploitation of a common pool resource. We develop a model of Nash behavior by identical risk neutral harvesters to explain individual equilibrium preferences for enforcement of an efficient harvest quota. If the quota is not enforced well, we demonstrate that individual harvesters will always prefer increased enforcement-either increased monitoring or increased penalties-of the quota. We conduct a test of this theoretical result with data from framed common pool resource experiments conducted in artisanal fishing communities in three regions of Colombia. Subjects were given the opportunity to express their preferences for enforcement by voting on two levels of enforcement of a harvest quota, with and without communication. The two enforcement strategies involved the same probability that the government would audit individual harvesters, but differed in the level of the penalty for noncompliance. Contrary to theory, individuals voted for the lower inefficient penalty about 80% of the time and groups implemented this weaker enforcement strategy over 90% of the time. Giving subjects the opportunity to vote on the enforcement strategy did not lead to more efficient harvests, nor did allowing subjects to communicate before voting.
Introduction
The standard externality resulting from the exploitation of common pool fisheries (and other common pool resources) is that individual harvests increase the costs of other harvesters.
Consequently, noncooperative and unregulated exploitation of a fishery is generally inefficient. . In many cases, therefore, government regulation of common pool resources is justified. Of course, all regulations must be enforced. Thus, the efficient design of a common pool regulation must include efficient enforcement strategies to counteract harvesters' incentives to violate a regulation and to account for the costs of enforcement. However, many fisheries regulations are poorly enforced (Dolsak and Ostrom 2003) , especially in the developing world. Potential reasons include the unwillingness of authorities to allocate adequate resources to enforcement and the lack of institutional capacity.
In this paper we analyze, both theoretically and with experimental evidence, one aspect of weak enforcement of common pool fisheries: namely, do individual harvesters prefer stricter enforcement of fishery regulations? This is an important issue because individual harvesters may have opportunities to influence and participate in the design and implementation of regulations, and hence, to express their preferences for weaker or stronger enforcement. Stronger enforcement of a regulation involves a fundamental tradeoff for the individual harvesterstronger enforcement increases the expected costs of noncompliance for an individual, but encourages lower aggregate harvests so that the cost externality associated with harvesting from a common pool is reduced. Which effect dominates will determine whether individual harvesters prefer stronger or weaker enforcement.
Our motivation for studying this aspect of weak enforcement of fisheries regulations comes from our interest in the efficacy of government regulations of artisanal fisheries in the developing world. Enforcement of such regulations is typically quite weak. Thus, our primary interest is whether small-scale harvesters in a regulated fishery prefer that the government exert more enforcement pressure on these fisheries or if weak enforcement is consistent with their desires.
We begin by developing a theoretical model of identical risk neutral harvesters of a common pool resource to explain individual preferences for enforcement of an efficient harvest quota. We derive an optimal harvest regulation that consists of a harvest quota and a costly monitoring strategy to enforce the quota, given a fixed unit penalty for noncompliance. We then suppose that the quota is imperfectly enforced in the sense that monitoring is not sufficient to induce full compliance with the quota, and determine whether individual harvesters prefer increased enforcement. We demonstrate that individual harvesters will always prefer increased enforcement-either increased monitoring or increased penalties-of the quota. The reason is that stricter enforcement leads to lower aggregate harvests, which benefit an individual harvester more than the increase in the expected costs of noncompliance.
We test this theoretical result with data from framed common pool resource experiments conducted in three geographically-distinct artisanal fishing communities in Colombia with subjects whose livelihoods depend upon successful management of a shared resource. Subjects in some sessions were given the opportunity to express their preferences for enforcement by voting on two levels of the marginal penalty for violating a harvest quota, one low and the other significantly higher. The harvest quota and the probability that the government would audit individual harvesters were constant for all the treatments. Our theoretical model predicts that the subjects would always vote for the higher penalty, make more conservative harvest choices, and be better off than if the regulation were enforced with the lower penalty.
Contrary to this prediction, subjects and groups were rarely willing to implement the more efficient penalty. In the absence of communication, individuals voted for the higher penalty only about 20% of the time, and as a result, groups implemented this stricter enforcement strategy through majority rule less than 10% of the time. This finding is robust across the three regions. Moreover, giving subjects this opportunity to participate in part of the design of a regulation by voting on the quota violation penalty did not improve the efficiency of harvest choices.
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The experimental literature on participation in the design of policies to promote more efficient choices in social dilemmas is mixed. While some researchers have found that voting on 1 In many common pool field experiments like ours, subjects tend to be more conservative than predicted by models of purely self-interested harvesters (e.g., Cardenas et al. 2000; Velez et al. 2009 ). We find this result in our study as well.
certain elements of policies can increase cooperation in these settings, 2 this is rarely the case for subject participation in the design of enforcement. In a common pool resource experiment, Vyrastekova and van Soest (2003) asked subjects to vote on whether to allow an enforcer (an experiment participant) to keep the fines when taking violators to court. An affirmative vote was the efficient choice; however, they found that harvesters infrequently voted to allow the enforcer to keep these penalties, leading to inefficient outcomes. Bischoff (2007) also found that allowing subjects to vote on rules did not lead to improved outcomes. Bischoff's main conclusion is that although subjects often voted for efficient quotas, they were reluctant to support increased monitoring intensity. Consequently, groups that could change inefficient regulations through majority rule voting actually performed worse than groups who were not given this opportunity.
In a public goods experiment, Tyran and Feld (2006) compare the effects of an exogenously-imposed regulation that required each person to contribute all of her endowment to the public good vis-à-vis allowing subjects to vote on the implementation of this regulation. In both scenarios, the regulation was backed by perfect monitoring and a penalty for all violations of this requirement. Their main conclusion is that compliance is significantly greater when the subjects voted to implement a regulation with a sanction that was too low to induce full compliance. Our experiments, as well as those of Vyrastekova and van Soest (2003) and Bischoff (2007) , are fundamentally different from Tyran and Feld's because their subjects voted on whether to impose a regulation. In our work, subjects voted on the severity of sanctions, given that a regulation would be imposed. Thus, Tyran and Feld do not address the question of individual desires for increased enforcement that is the goal of our study. Moreover, the penalty in Tyran and Feld's work is imposed with certainty in cases of noncompliance, whereas our penalties are imposed randomly because monitoring to detect noncompliance is imperfect.
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These authors took a similar approach in a separate experimental study of tax compliance and found similar results; specifically they found that compliance was higher when subjects voted to accept a certain fine for noncompliance than when the fine was exogenously imposed (Feld and Tyran 2002) .
The study that is closest to ours is by Alm et al. (1999) who studied voting on the enforcement parameters of an income tax policy (tax rate, audit rate and fine). They also found that subjects were unwilling to vote for stricter enforcement. When subjects could not communicate, they always voted against stricter enforcement, both increases in audit probabilities and increases in the fine for evaded taxes, even in treatments in which it was efficient to do so. The subjects sometimes voted for increased enforcement when they could communicate with one another. Moreover, when the subjects voted for weaker enforcement, compliance rates decreased significantly. Alm et al. (1999) suggest that voting against stronger enforcement sends a signal of social acceptability of tax evasion.
In summary, while other researchers have found that subject participation in the decision about whether to enforce an external regulation may lead to more efficient choices (Tyran and Feld 2006) , it is clear that participation in the decision about the level of enforcement does not (Alm et al. 1999) . We come to the same conclusion, but our work is the first to examine this issue in a field setting. The subjects in our experiments are mainly fishermen who operate under poorly enforced regulations or are intimately connected to a local fishery in other ways. Thus, the overexploitation of common pool resources and the (in)effectiveness of government regulations designed to promote efficient harvests are critically important to the subjects in our experiments. Moreover, we exploit the heterogeneity of the field by conducting our experiments in three regions of Colombia in communities that are dependent on a local fishery, but that vary in other ways. In each area we find the same general result: subjects are unwilling to vote for stricter regulatory enforcement, even when it would be in their best interests (both individually and collectively) to do so. Thus, we demonstrate that results obtained in laboratory experiments about the inefficiency of allowing subjects to vote on enforcement extend to artisanal fishing communities in Colombia.
Individual preferences for enforcing a common pool harvest quota
Our experimental design is based on a model of behavior by risk neutral harvesters who face a harvest quota that they may violate. The model is a static one that is similar to the model developed by Cornes and Sandler (1983) , and used in experimental work by Ostrom et al. Imagine that a harvest quota has been imposed in the common pool resource. Suppose further that this quota has been set at the level of individual harvests that maximizes the joint payoffs of the harvesters less the aggregate costs of enforcing the quota. Denote the harvest quota as e x , and note that it must be a uniform quota because the harvesters are identical. To enforce this quota the authorities monitor the harvesters and impose a penalty when one is found to have taken more from the common pool than the quota allows. Let the probability that a violation by an individual harvester is detected be π and let this probability be the same for each Each individual harvester chooses a harvest level to maximize his expected payoff,
subject to e i x x ≥ to reflect the fact that an individual never has the incentive to be overcompliant. It is straightforward to show that the unique symmetric Nash equilibrium harvests
Assume throughout that 0 p c πφ − − > so that Nash harvests are always strictly positive. Using
Now let us determine the optimal harvest regulation. The optimal harvest quota e x and optimal detection probability e π maximize the net value of harvests from the common minus the costs of monitoring, taking into account how the enforcement variables determine equilibrium harvests. Let the cost of establishing the optimal detection probability for each e n e x x π φ ≤ to again reflect the fact that harvesters will never find it optimal to over-comply.
Note that the harvest quota does not enter the authority's objective function [4] . This implies that there is no loss or gain to setting the quota so that the harvesters are fully compliant; that is,
e n e x x π φ = .
5 Once this constraint is imposed on the authority's problem, it is straightforward to show that the optimal detection probability is 
Since both of these derivatives are strictly positive, each individual harvester is better off with stricter enforcement of the efficient harvest quota.
6
It is the nature of the social dilemma that all common pool users are better off if they restrict their harvests, but individually they have little incentive to do so. A regulation can align individual and group incentives, but it must be enforced well to be efficient. However, even a poorly enforced regulation that is widely violated can improve the welfare of harvesters if it motivates them to restrict their take from the common pool. The regulation will not be efficient, but it could be an improvement. Now, an individual harvester that violates a quota would never prefer more stringent monitoring or higher sanctions directed solely at him. However, our results reveal that the harvester and all others prefer stricter enforcement if it is imposed on the entire group. The reason is simple: enhanced enforcement pushes aggregate harvests toward the efficient level, which produces a gain for each harvester that is greater than the increase in their individual expected sanctions for noncompliance.
Experimental Design
We test the theoretical result that harvesters prefer stricter enforcement with data from framed common pool resource experiments conducted in three regions of Colombia. We framed the experiments an individual harvesting decision from a local fishery. 7 To examine the robustness of our results, all experimental treatments were conducted in each of the three regions. These areas are similar in that each depends heavily on local fisheries-in fact, most of the participants in our experiments were fishermen-but they differ in many other ways. We do not pose hypotheses about how behavior may differ across regions, mainly because it is not possible to conduct rigorous tests with only three regions. However, a brief description of how the regions are different is appropriate. Summary statistics of the subjects' characteristics are provided in Table 1 . Subjects were placed in groups of five and participated in a hand-run, 20-period common pool resource experiment that was framed as a harvest decision from a fishery. In every session, the first stage consisted of 10 rounds in an unregulated common pool resource environment without communication. The 10-round second stage distinguished the six treatments with the 3×2 factorial design summarized in Table 2 . A total of 360 individuals participated in the experiments, divided into 72 five-person groups (3 regions × 6 treatments × 4 groups per treatment).
We consider two exogenously imposed enforcement strategies (Imposed Low and Imposed Medium) which consist of an individual harvest quota set at the level that maximizes a group's payoff ( e x = 2), but that differ with respect to the level of enforcement.
10 Both enforcement strategies have the same π = 10% probability that a subject's harvest choice would be inspected. 11 If an inspection revealed that a subject's harvest was greater than two, then that person incurred a financial penalty. For the Low penalty, the fine was φ L = 27 pesos per unit above the quota. With this penalty, the resulting marginal expected penalty is not high enough to change the pure Nash strategy equilibrium from the unregulated equilibrium of seven units of harvest by each individual. For the Medium penalty, the fine was φ M = 165 pesos per unit. The 9 Experiment instructions are available upon request. 10 We do not attempt to determine and implement the harvest quota that maximizes a group's payoff less monitoring costs, given by equation [8] in the previous section. To do so, we would have had to specify an ad hoc value for marginal monitoring costs m. Our hypothesis that individuals will always prefer increased enforcement is unaffected by this design choice. 11 The results of inspections were not made public. In order to decide who in a group, if anyone, was inspected in a particular round, a ballot was chosen from a bag containing 5 ballots with the participants' numbers on them and 5 other blank ballots.
Nash strategy equilibrium with this penalty is reduced to six units of harvest for each individual.
We chose enforcement strategies that could not support full compliance to the harvest quota, at least under a conventional theory of regulatory enforcement, because this is likely to be a characteristic of most regulatory controls of resource use in the developing world.
Each of the two voting treatments (Vote/Com and Vote/NoCom) allowed the subjects to vote on the size of the marginal penalty (φ L = 27 pesos or φ M = 165 pesos), while keeping the same harvest quota and monitoring probability. Majority rule determined which penalty would be implemented. The vote took place at the start of each round. Participants were informed about the level of the penalty chosen by the majority and the distribution of the votes before deciding on their levels of harvest. The expected Nash equilibrium payoff of a risk neutral subject under the low penalty is 556.5 pesos, while it is 628 pesos under the medium penalty. Thus, as we have demonstrated theoretically, subjects are expected to always vote for the medium penalty.
Face-to-face verbal communication was permitted only in the three communication treatments. Every round, prior to making any decisions, subjects were given five minutes to discuss the experiment before returning to their seats and making their decisions in private.
After all subjects completed their decisions, the experimenter collected this information and announced to the group the aggregate level of harvest for that round. With this information individuals were able to calculate both the total harvest of the other four group members and their own individual payoffs. Individual earnings in the experiments ranged between 11,220 and 22,900 pesos with an average of 15,240 pesos (about US$6.00). 12 Earnings were paid in cash at the end of each experiment. Each experiment lasted about 3 hours.
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Results
Voting choices
Individual and group voting results for the two voting treatments are presented in Tables 3 and 4 .
Although our theoretical development produces the hypothesis that subjects would always vote for stricter enforcement of the two-unit harvest quota, the experiment results strongly suggest otherwise. Out of a total of 600 individual votes cast without communication (12 groups of 5 subjects over 10 rounds), only 119 (20%) were for the medium penalty. Consequently, out of 120 opportunities (12 groups over 10 rounds), groups voted to implement the medium penalty less than 10% of the time. That subjects and groups voted against the medium penalty is consistent across regions. As shown in Table 3 , in the absence of communication, individuals in the Caribbean voted for the medium penalty 7.5% of the time, in the Magdalena region 20.5%, and in the Pacific region 31.5%. Table 4 shows that, as a result of these individual votes, the medium penalty was never implemented in the Caribbean, in the Magdalena the medium penalty was implemented in only 4 of 40 opportunities, and in the Pacific only 5 of 40 opportunities.
Overall, communication did not change individual voting decisions by much and groups
implemented the medium penalty only 16% of the time. Therefore, our main finding is that subjects and groups rarely voted to implement the more efficient medium penalty and this is robust across regions. These conclusions are consistent with the results of Bischoff (2007), 12 A day's wage in the regions where the experiments were conducted varied between 10,000 and 15,000 pesos at the time of the experiments. 13 Before each experiment began, instructions were read aloud by the monitor and several practice rounds that did not count toward final earnings were played to familiarize the participants with the experiments. The real money rounds began after all participants understood the rules of the game. Vyrastekova and van Soest (2003) , and Alm et al. (1999) , who also found that subjects were reluctant to impose stricter enforcement on their groups, even when it was efficient to do so.
Effect of regulations on harvesting decisions in stage 2
To examine the effects of the regulations in stage 2, we begin with the average harvests in Table   5 . In the stage 1 no-regulation baseline, individual harvests averaged 5.6 in each of the three regions. Similar to other studies in this area, these average harvests are significantly below the Nash equilibrium prediction of seven units, but significantly above the efficient individual harvest of two units (Velez, et al. 2009 and 2010) . 14 Using a random effects Tobit model not reported in this paper, we confirm the results of Velez, et al. (2010) that (a) Although subjects rarely support the more stringent medium penalty, it is still possible that the ability to participate in the decision about the enforcement parameters could lead to more efficient harvest choices, even when the group collectively decides not to implement the medium penalty. To determine the effects on individual harvests of voting versus exogenously imposing an enforcement strategy we estimate the pair of random effects Tobit models in Table 6 that control for the censored nature of the data (individual decisions were constrained to be between 1 and 9) and the individual repeated observations. To control for changes in individual decisions over time, the first model in Table 6 includes only the data from the first five periods of stage 2, and the second model includes just the last five periods (stage 1 data are not included). The dependent variable is the individual harvest decision; the explanatory variables include dummy variables for the treatment effects by region, period effects (for stage two, the periods are numbered 11-20), and sociodemographic characteristics. The model excludes the constant, so the coefficients for the treatment × region dummy variables reflect individual harvest decisions after controlling for sociodemographic characteristics and time. Because of the small number of observations, the data do not include those instances in which groups voted to implement the medium penalty. Table 7 summarizes the Wald chi-squared tests of hypotheses related to both regional and treatment effects based on the models in Table 6 .
Regional differences: As reported in Velez et al. (2010) , and confirmed in Table 7 , there are significant regional differences in individual harvests with the low penalty regardless of whether it was imposed or voted upon, or whether subjects were able to communicate with each other. Interestingly, there are significant regional differences in harvests with the imposed medium penalty in the first five periods of the second stage, but these differences are insignificant in the last five periods of the stage. Recall that the low penalty was chosen so that the expected penalty was too low to change predicted behavior relative to the stage 1 baseline.
That the low penalty induced more conservative harvest choices indicates that subjects responded to the regulatory frame, not the expected penalty. Velez, et al. (2010) suggest that institutions that rely on framing effects to induce change are more likely to be sensitive to regional differences, whereas those that rely on stronger monetary incentives will yield more consistent decisions. Since the subjects in our study overwhelmingly voted for the imposition of the low penalty, it is not surprising that we observe significant regional differences in individual harvest decisions in the Vote treatments.
Voting effects: The literature on voting for institutional designs argues that this mechanism can coordinate expectations and legitimize regulations via participation. Hence the voting mechanism might increase compliance (decrease harvests) compared to imposed regulations. However, whether voting will have an impact on individual harvest decisions is unclear when an inefficient penalty is chosen, as happened most of the time in our experiments.
From Table 7 , we generally do not observe significant differences in harvests between treatments in which subjects voted to implement the low penalty and when this low penalty was exogenously imposed. The main exception is in the Caribbean when subjects could communicate. Interestingly, average harvests were significantly higher in this region when subjects voted to implement the low penalty than when this penalty was imposed on them. In the Magdalena region, individual harvests were significantly lower when the subjects could communicate and they voted to implement the low penalty in the first five periods of the second stage, but this significance disappeared in the second five periods.
We can also evaluate whether regulatory participation through voting on enforcement levels was more effective at reducing harvests than the exogenously imposed medium penalty, even as subjects usually voted to implement the low penalty. The results in Table 7 suggest that this is not the case. For all three regions, there is usually no difference in harvest choices between the Imposed Medium and Vote(Low) treatments; this result holds regardless of whether subjects could communicate. When there are significant differences-that is, in the Magdalena region in the first five periods when the subjects could not communicate and in the last five periods when they could communicate-individual harvests are lower under the imposed medium penalty than when the subjects voted to implement the low penalty. Our overall conclusion, then, is that voting on the level of enforcement does not reduce individual harvests vis-à-vis exogenously imposed enforcement.
Communication effects when voting: There is a robust literature which suggests that communication in social dilemmas usually results in more efficient decisions (Shankar and Pavitt, 2002 , Cardenas et al., 2003 , Ostrom, 2010 . Contrary to the literature, the results in Table   7 indicate that allowing subjects to communicate before voting did not reduce harvests ( 
Conclusion
We have examined, both theoretically and with framed field experiments, individual harvesters' preferences for government enforcement of a harvest quota imposed on the exploitation of a common pool resource. Our theoretical results are unequivocal. In a situation involving poor enforcement of an otherwise efficient harvest quota, individual harvesters will always prefer stricter enforcement. Our experimental results are equally unequivocal in their contradiction of the theoretical result-subjects rarely voted to implement a higher penalty for violating a harvest quota. Consequently, allowing subjects to vote on the design of regulatory enforcement did not lead to more efficient choices than simply imposing a weak enforcement strategy. Others have found similar results in laboratory experiments, but we demonstrate that these results also hold in the field with actual common pool users who operate under poorly enforced fishing regulations.
Thus, the reluctance of individuals to vote for stronger enforcement of rules that could make them better off are not likely to be mere artifacts of university labs.
However, recall that other studies of participation in policy design have produced more positive results, so the strong negative reaction to stricter enforcement is a puzzle that could use further investigation. Could it be a general mistrust of the coercive powers of government? Is it due to individuals' inability to discern how increasing the expected costs of their actions could lead to more efficient group behavior? These and other possible explanations for the reluctance of individuals and groups to impose efficient enforcement on their behavior can be tested with well-designed experiments.
Studies that have found positive effects of participation in rule design have all been laboratory experiments. We think it is important to conduct these and related experiments in field settings. We have shown that subject behavior is similar in laboratory and field settings in terms of expressing preferences for stricter enforcement, but we do not know if this similarity extends to other dimensions of policy.
The literature, including our contribution, suggests that individual participation is helpful for some dimensions of policy, and not at all helpful for other dimensions. Thus, the value of direct democratic participation in policy design is ambiguous. Clearly, further research is necessary to clarify the benefits and costs of participation and to uncover the most efficient form of participation in the design of policies to confront social dilemmas. In each region, there were 4 groups × 5 subjects/group × 10 rounds per group for a total of N=200. In each region, there were 4 groups × 10 rounds per group for a total of N=40. 
